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Introduction 
European media systems have been affected by major changes in the last few decades 
that have facilitated the dissemination of populist messages, including increased media owner-
ship concentration, increased commercialization, and a stronger orientation towards news val-
ues (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). At the same time, Europe has faced several political 
crises, such as the European sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, and ‘Brexit’. Against this 
background, we analyze populist communication in immigration news coverage as well as in 
opinion pieces within two time periods (2016 & 2017) across twelve European countries. We 
define populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Mudde, 2004) and derive four dimensions of populist 
communication: people-centrism, anti-elitism, the exclusion of specific out-groups, and restor-
ing sovereignty (Mény & Surel, 2002; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 
2017). This chapter provides a theoretical introduction to populist communication in the media, 
and a detailed description of the methodological approach, as well as first descriptive results of 
the study.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Populist Ideology and Populist Communication 
Building on Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, and de Vreese (2017), we define 
populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Mudde, 2004) and follow a “communication-centered approach” 
to studying populist political communication (Stanyer, Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017, p. 354). 
Thus, we focus on the content of populist communication and determine the degree of populism 
in the media by how frequently political actors, journalists, or other actors communicate popu-
list key messages (de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018; Engesser, Fawzi, 
& Larsson, 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017).  
Following on from the three dimensions (people-centrism, anti-elitism, and the exclu-
sion of ‘others’) discussed in the introduction of this volume, we consider an additional dimen-
sion in the framework – restoring sovereignty. This is consistent with the idea that “populism 
tries to give power back to the people and restore popular sovereignty. Populists believe that 
politics should be based on the immediate expression of the general will of the people” (Abts 
& Rummens, 2007, p. 408; see also Canovan, 2002; Mény & Surel, 2002; Mudde, 2004). As 
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such, we regard the emphasis on the struggle over sovereignty as a distinct component of pop-
ulism. 
Populist key messages that can be assigned to these four dimensions focus on three tar-
get groups. The first is ‘the people’, who are regarded as pure and good and whose empower-
ment and sovereignty is demanded. Thus, ‘the people’ is mainly the target of positive, advoca-
tive populist key messages. Furthermore, ‘the people’ are conceived as a homogenous entity 
whose common interests, desires, and will, need to be vindicated against adversaries who do 
not belong to ‘the people’. The first of these out-groups, and thus the second target group, is 
‘the elite’, which is perceived as corrupt, inept, out of touch with the people, and denied sover-
eignty. ‘The elite’, which can be the political, economic, juridical, media, scientific, or cultural 
elite, is target of a vertical differentiation from ‘the people’ and, hence, of negative, conflictive 
populist key messages. The third target group are ‘the others’, conceived as specific social 
groups who do not share the people’s “good” characteristics, values, or opinions (Albertazzi & 
McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). These out-groups are specific segments of the population who do not 
comply with the monolithic conception of ‘the people’ and are juxtaposed to the people in terms 
of needs, origin, ethnicity, citizenship, political rights, etc. Thus, they are subject to a horizontal 
differentiation or even a “downward-oriented social comparison”, since ‘the others’ are often 
seen as inferior to ‘the people’ (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 21). ‘The people’, ‘the elite’, and 
‘the others’ can all be conceptualized in different ways, for example in political, economic, or 
cultural terms. Whether ‘the people’ is defined as, for example, ‘sovereign’, ‘class’, ‘nation’, 
‘ethnic group’, also implies who does not belong to ‘the people’ (Reinemann et al., 2017). Con-
sequently, the conceptions of ‘the elite’ and ‘the others’ in populist key messages are expected 
to be closely related to the notion of ‘the people’. 
Figure 5.1 summarizes the relationships between the four dimensions and three target 
groups of populist communication. Although there is some disagreement about how the differ-
ent dimensions of populist communication relate to one another and which elements are neces-
sary or sufficient to speak of populism, we argue, in accordance with the conceptualisation set 
out at the outset, that complete populist ideology (see also Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) should 
entail all four dimensions. However, earlier research has shown that populist ideology is often 
communicated in a fragmented way, especially in the media (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 
2016). The individual dimensions are likely to be found empirically in different combinations 
or in varying degrees, indicating different types of populist communication (Reinemann et al., 
2017). Thus, we consider populist communication as a combination of these four dimensions 
which complement, imply, or even evoke each other (Müller et al., 2017) and empirically man-
ifest in different types of populist communication. 
 In this chapter, we focus on these four dimensions and three target groups of populist 
key messages, and thus on the content of populist communication. However, as other authors 
elaborate (de Vreese et al., 2018; Engesser et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016), populist ideology 
or the content of populist communication (what?) may be supplemented by populist style, 
which refers to the form of populist communication (how?). Unlike the ideological or content-
related components of populist communication, there is still little consensus on how to define 
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or operationalize populist style. Nevertheless, efforts to systematize populist style elements em-
phasize the dimensions of negativity, emotionalization, simplification, and sociability 
(Engesser et al., 2017, see also Maurer et al. in this volume).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Key concepts and messages of populist communication 
 
Populism in the Media 
 While classical research literature on political populism (see, e.g., Canovan, 1981; Tag-
gart, 2000) does not mention the media at all, more recent studies have increasingly emphasized 
the role of the media in the dissemination of populist messages (see, e.g., Engesser et al., 2017; 
Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017; Müller et al., 2017). From a political communication per-
spective, the role of the media is crucial to understanding the ubiquity of populist messages, as 
well as the rise and success of recent populist political actors (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017). 
With regard to populism in editorial content, Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann (2017) 
distinguish between populism by the media and populism through the media. Rather simplified, 
these two perspectives differentiate whether the communicators of populist messages are the 
media themselves, political actors, or other actors whose messages are disseminated through 
the media. The first perspective, populism by the media, refers to a media populism that is 
actively propagated by media organizations or journalists (Esser et al., 2017). Thus, the media 
may themselves appeal to the people and construct in and out-groups, or promote anti-elitism 
(Mazzoleni, 2014). This is similar to Krämer’s (2014) notion of media populism. The cause can 
be either a specific journalistic ideology, or an increasing commercialization of the media. The 
second perspective, populism through the media, focuses on the media’s provision of a platform 
for populists, which facilitates the distribution and amplification of populist messages originat-
ing from politicians and other actors. This is closely connected to the idea of a – generally 
unintentional – convergence of goals between the “production logic” of commercialized media, 
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and that of populist political actors (Esser et al., 2017, p. 369; Mazzoleni, 2008, pp. 54–55). 
According to this perspective, media logic and news values create a favorable opportunity struc-
ture to populist messages that may, in turn, be anticipated and exploited by populist actors (Es-
ser et al., 2017). Thus, intentionally or unintentionally, the media can provide a conducive stage 
for populism (Mazzoleni, 2014). 
Besides these opportunity structures in the media, several factors in the structural and 
situational context on the macro level may influence the degree of populist communication in 
journalistic media, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 in the introduction in this volume (see also Reine-
mann et al., 2017). For instance, the political, journalistic, and issue culture of a country may 
affect how the media cover real-world events and politicians’ actions and statements, and 
whether journalists may use populist key messages themselves. Moreover, journalistic media 
interact with citizens, which – depending on the country – may have varying predispositions, 
attitudes, opinions, or reality perceptions. On the one hand, this may be the result of media 
coverage in combination with other context factors. On the other hand, this may also influence 
news media coverage in a feedback loop. Finally, country-specific context factors, especially 
situational factors, are expected to change over time. Specific factors that are assumed to influ-
ence populist communication in news media across countries as well as over time, will be elab-
orated in more detail in the following chapters by Maurer et al. and Esser et al. 
This chapter aims to answer four research questions. First, we investigate how the four 
core dimensions of populist communication are distributed in news coverage on immigration 
and in opinion pieces across twelve countries (RQ1). Second, we analyze how these core di-
mensions of populist communication are related to each other empirically (RQ2). Additionally, 
we seek to discover who the main speakers of populist key messages are (RQ3). Finally, we 
explore how ‘the people’, ‘the elite’, and ‘the others’ who are targeted in populist key messages, 




Our investigation concerning populism in the media includes twelve countries: Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. These countries represent different geographical European areas and 
differ greatly in terms of structural factors (see the chapter by Maurer et al.) as well as situa-
tional factors (see the chapter by Esser et al.) that may influence the relationship between pop-
ulism and the media. This allows us to analyze the relationship between populism and the media 
across different contextual settings. For instance, while in northern Europe populism is typically 
associated with right-wing populist parties, populism in southern Europe more often also in-
cludes left-wing populism (see also the chapters by Salgado et al. and Stanyer et al.). In western 
Europe, research on populism has often focused on populist parties’ influence on long-estab-
lished mainstream parties. In central and eastern European countries, populism has traditionally 
had a stronger focus on anti-elitism, the fight against corruption, and ethnic or religious minor-
ities as out-groups (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017), though in the wake of the recent European 
5 
 
refugee crisis the focus has been shifting onto immigrants as the primary out-group for many 
central and eastern European countries (Stanley, 2017).  
To allow, not only for a cross-national comparison, but also for a temporal comparison, 
our study includes two waves1. We used two constructed weeks, the first wave from February 
22 - April 2, 2016, and the second wave from February 20 - April 1, 2017. For most countries, 
these two time periods represent routine time1. These periods were deliberately chosen in order 
to investigate the exact time frame across all twelve countries, to enhance comparability as well 
as to allow for the comparison of situational factors over time (see chapter by Esser et al.).  
For each country, three leading newspapers fulfilling the following criteria, were se-
lected: (a) they have a large reach among the audience and agenda-setting power for politicians 
and other media, (b) they represent both up-market and mass-market journalism, and (c) they 
represent different political leanings. For all newspapers, the digital version (E-Paper) was ob-
tained for each day of the two constructed weeks (Table 5.1).2  
 
Table 5.1 Media outlets in the sample 
Country Up-market Mass-market 
Bulgaria 24 Chassa Trud Telegraph 
Czech Republic Pravo MF Dnes Blesk 
France Le Figaro Le Monde Le Parisien 
Germany Die Welt Süddeutsche Zeitung B.Z. 
Greece Ta Nea Kathimerini Efimerida ton Syntakton 
Israel Haaretz - 
Yedioth Aharonoth 
Israel Hayom 




Norway Aftenposten Dagsavisen VG (Verdens gang) 
Poland Gazeta Wyborcza Rzeczpospolita Fakt 
Serbia Politika Večernje novosti Blic 
Switzerland NZZ Tages-Anzeiger Blick 
United Kingdom Telegraph Guardian Daily Mail 
 
In selecting the articles, we followed two different sampling strategies. The first sample 
is based on the topic, whilst the second sample is based on the story type of an article. Articles 
that fulfilled the criteria of both sampling strategies were considered for both samples. Table 
5.2 summarizes the sample numbers for both sampling strategies as well as for the overlap 
between the two. 
                                                 
1 For two countries, France and the United Kingdom, only the second wave in 2017 was obtained. These two 
countries will therefore not be included in temporal comparisons. 
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The first sample, henceforth referred to as immigration news sample, focuses on articles 
(both news and commentary) related to the topic of immigration. We have chosen to focus on 
this topic because it has been described as one of the driving forces for the support for populist 
parties in western and northern Europe (Stanyer et al., 2017). It is particularly vulnerable to 
exclusionist populist rhetoric and poses a challenge, in particular, to responsible media cover-
age. Following this sampling strategy, articles were sampled using a search string consisting of 
words related to immigration, translated into the respective languages. To ensure comparability 
and functional equivalence, the translation of the search strings was completed with close co-
operation between the different country teams, and the search terms were adapted or supple-
mented for individual countries. All articles which contained at least one of the terms in the 
respective search strings, were included in this first sampling pool. If this resulted in more than 
ten articles for an individual newspaper on a given day, a random sample of ten articles was 
drawn for that day. 
 
Table 5.2 Number of news items in the samples across waves 
 Immigration News Sample Opinion Piece Sample Sample Overlap 
  
Year Total Year Total Year Total 
2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 
Bulgaria 30 13 43 17 16 33 4 0 8 
Czech Republic 88 75 163 44 38 82 21 32 53 
France - 58 58 - 39 39 - 9 9 
Germany 118 107 225 72 66 138 27 14 41 
Greece 144 28 172 92 88 180 40 8 48 
Israel 24 38 62 92 58 150 7 10 17 
Italy 113 145 258 72 81 153 17 9 26 
Norway 83 86 169 66 69 135 19 22 41 
Poland 5 6 11 32 17 49 2 2 4 
Serbia 31 26 57 42 42 84 4 1 5 
Switzerland 125 107 232 59 66 125 26 19 45 
United Kingdom - 73 73 - 52 52 - 17 17 
Total 761 762 1523 588 632 1220 167 143 310 
 
Despite its centrality for populism in Europe, the discourse on immigration may be very 
different and of varying relevance in northern, southern, western, and central-eastern Europe. 
With this in mind, we have drawn a second sample. This second sample, henceforth referred to 
as opinion piece sample, is based on the story type or genre of an article and includes all opin-
ion-oriented formats, regardless of their topic. This is grounded in the theoretical notion that 
interpretative or opinion-oriented journalism may be especially prone to populism (Esser et al., 
2017; Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017). This sampling pool included all opinion pieces, edito-
rials, columns, and commentaries that were explicitly labeled as such or are distinguished 
graphically from straight news articles, and which appeared in the following newspaper sec-
tions: politics, international politics, national politics, and regional politics. If an individual 
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newspaper contained more than five opinion-oriented articles on a given day, a random sample 
of five articles was drawn for that day (see Table 5.2).  
Operationalization 
Populist key messages. The most important concept in the conducted content analysis 
is, of course, populist communication. To measure this, we use an index of populist communi-
cation which is a formative measure (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008) consisting of the 
four dimensions described above: people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring sovereignty, and ex-
clusion. Twelve populist key messages, which were defined on theoretical grounds and each 
correspond to one dimension, were used as indicators. In the operationalization, we initially 
built on other recent international content analyses on populist communication (Ernst, Engesser, 
Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; Müller et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016), which operationalize 
populist communication using three dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring 
sovereignty. In order to attain the agreed upon definition of populism and populist communi-
cation in this book (see the introduction to this volume), and based upon the theoretical consid-
erations elaborated above, we extended the existing operationalization with the additional di-
mension of “exclusion” (see also Engesser et al., 2017). This dimension was operationalized 
independently for this study at the article level. 
Populist key messages: people-centrism. The first dimension – people-centrism – con-
sists of four key messages that advocate for the people (Wirth et al., 2016). These key messages 
all require explicit mention of ‘the people’, which can be defined as the population of a country, 
those who share a common origin or culture, the citizens in contrast to those who govern them, 
or those without special rank or position in society. The people may be regarded as nation, 
ethnos, demos, class, or strata. In this study, we distinguish between political, economic, legal, 
geographical, cultural, religious, or generalized conceptualizations of ‘the people’.  
The people may be addressed as a whole, as a metaphor (‘man on the street’, ‘the com-
mon man’), or as a subgroup that is regarded as representing all people. If subgroups are men-
tioned, it is crucial that everyone may consider themselves, at least hypothetically, to be a mem-
ber of this subgroup (e.g. ‘hardworking people’ or ‘voters’ in contrast to ‘women’ or ‘children’). 
Residents of a specific geographic area are also treated as the people (e.g. ‘neighbors’, ‘people 
of London’). Subgroups that are widely regarded as social minorities (e.g. immigrants, crimi-
nals) or that express special interests or a specific clientele (e.g. teachers) are not considered to 
be the people. References to the people can be made through words such as ‘Switzerland’, 
‘Britain’, ‘(the) public’, ‘(the) citizen(s)’, ‘(the) voter(s)’, ‘(the) taxpayer(s)’, ‘(the) resident(s)’, 
‘(the) consumer(s)’, ‘(the) population’, ‘(the) nation’, etc. 
First, a speaker using populist political communication can demonstrate his closeness 
to the people by approaching the people. This means that an actor (e.g. politician, journalist, or 
other actor) describes his or herself (or is described) as belonging to the people, being close to 
the people, knowing the people or their needs, speaking for the people, caring for the people, 
or approaching the people in any other similar way. The underlying idea of this key message is 
that the actor claims to represent or embody the people, or is seen as representing or embodying 
the people (Wirth et al., 2016).  
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Second, by praising the people’s virtues a speaker may attribute and emphasize positive 
(personality) traits to the people, or express faith in the people’s ability and judgment, such as 
common sense. For example, the people may be described as good, virtuous, moral, charis-
matic, credible, intelligent, competent, consistent, considerate, benevolent, etc. This category 
also applies if the people is cleared of being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, 
undemocratic, etc. (Wirth et al., 2016). 
Third, an actor can praise the people’s achievements. Here, in contrast to praising the 
people’s virtues, praising the people’s achievements focuses not on how the people is, but on 
what the people has done. This key message is coded if a positive development, situation, or 
success is associated with an effort by the people. Achievements include important, successful, 
or ‘right’ actions as well as other accomplishments (Wirth et al., 2016). 
The fourth people-centrist key message is describing the people as homogenous. This 
refers to the monolithic conception of the people in a populist worldview and means that the 
people is seen as sharing a common understanding of the world, common feelings (e.g. 'the 
people’s fears'), common opinions (e.g. approval/disapproval), or a common will (demands, 
plans, orders to the government, e.g. 'the people’s will'). This is in direct contrast with the con-
cept of a fractured, pluralist population of individuals with their own feelings, opinions, and 
desires, who do disagree on some points (e.g. some people/most of the people/many citi-
zens/57% of the people) (Wirth et al., 2016). 
Populist key messages: anti-elitism. The second dimension – anti-elitism – combines 
three key messages that are all conflictive toward the elites (Wirth et al., 2016). Actors can 
discredit or blame the elite in their communication, and in doing so, detach the elite from the 
people. ‘The elite’ is defined as those with the greatest power and influence within a society, 
especially because of their political power, wealth, or privilege. The elite can be allocated to 
the areas of politics, administration, economy, law, media, science, and culture. Additionally, 
the elite can be supranational or general (e.g. ‘the powerful ones’, ‘the ones above’, ‘the sys-
tem’). The elite may either be addressed in general terms, or by naming specific members of 
the elite. 
The first anti-elitist key message, discrediting the elite, stresses negative personality 
traits, mistakes, and unlawful or immoral behavior of the elites. The elites or their representa-
tives are portrayed as corrupt, evil, incapable, malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, undemocratic, 
etc. The elites, or their representatives, are denied of morality, charisma, credibility, intelli-
gence, competence, consistency, etc. (Wirth et al., 2016). 
The second anti-elitist key message, blaming the elite, focuses on specific actions of the 
elite. A speaker may hold the elite responsible or accountable for (or incapable of resolving) an 
undesirable or harmful situation. Thus, the elites are blamed for a negative development or 
situation, a specific failure, or a problem (Wirth et al., 2016).  
The third anti-elitist key message, detaching the elite from the people, requires both the 
mention of ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’. The elite is described as being detached from the people, 
as not belonging to the people, not being close to the people, not knowing the people and their 
needs, not speaking for the people, not caring for the people, not listening to the people, not 
performing everyday actions, or is distanced from the people in any other way. Ultimately, 
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detaching the elite from the people implies that it does not represent the people (Wirth et al., 
2016). 
Populist key messages: restoring sovereignty. The third dimension of populism, re-
storing sovereignty, comprises two key messages (Wirth et al., 2016). On one hand, an actor 
may demand popular sovereignty in two different ways. First, the speaker attributes power to 
the people by stating that the people should be able to decide on an issue, or that there is a 
democratic deficit. This means that the speaker argues for general institutional reforms to grant 
the people more power (i.e. by introducing direct-democratic elements). Second, the speaker 
may also argue in favor of implementing or enforcing the people’s decisions, for instance after 
a referendum. On the other hand, an actor can also establish a negative and conflictive approach 
by denying the sovereignty of the elite. Here, the speaker argues in favor of granting less power 
to the elite within the context of a specific issue (e.g. election, immigration, security) or of 
general institutional reforms to confine the power of the elite (Wirth et al., 2016). 
Populist key messages: exclusion. The fourth dimension, exclusion, contains three con-
flictive key messages towards specific social out-groups framed as ‘the others’. ‘The others’ 
are defined as population segments that are excluded from ‘the people’ or juxtaposed to them. 
The others may be addressed as any subgroup, minority, or clientele that does not fall into the 
category of the people or the elite. Examples of such groups are immigrants, specific ethnic or 
religious groups, criminals, homosexuals, etc. Similar to anti-elitism, actors, first, may discredit 
specific groups by denouncing, criticizing, and/or stigmatizing them. Thereby, negative per-
sonality traits, mistakes, and unlawful or immoral behavior of specific social groups are 
stressed. Second, actors may blame specific groups or hold them responsible for an undesirable 
or harmful situation or development. Third, actors may exclude specific groups from the people. 
These groups are characterized as ‘the others’ – as not belonging to the people or not sharing 
their virtues. We distinguish between political, economic, legal, geographical, cultural, and re-
ligious conceptualizations of ‘the others’ (see also Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
These twelve populist key messages were all measured as dummy variables. For each 
category, we coded at the story level, whether a given populist key message was present in an 
article or not – regardless of the speaker. For each dimension of populist communication, a 
maximum index, i.e. a dummy variable, was calculated where 1 indicates that at least one of 
the corresponding key messages was present. For the overall populism in the media index, the 
four dimension indices were summed up, indicating how many of the four dimensions were 
present for each article. Thus, the populism in the media index is a sum index ranging from 0 
to 4. A value of 0 means that the analyzed articles contained no populist key message. A value 
of 4 would mean that each story analyzed contained key messages from all four dimensions of 
populism. 
Speakers. For each populist key message, we coded whether the speaker was a political 
actor, a media actor, a citizen, or another actor. A speaker is an actor who was quoted in the 
news item either directly or indirectly. If a populist statement was made by the actual journalist, 
the speaker was coded as a media actor. If different speakers within an article voiced the same 
key message, it was coded for each speaker type. 
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Inter-Coder Reliability Across Countries 
The material was coded by a total of 26 coders. The country teams recruited native 
speaking coders from the respective countries, whose English proficiency was sufficient to read 
the codebook in English and to complete the coder training and reliability testing using English 
language material. Ensuring a common understanding of a codebook and inter-coder reliability 
across countries is a major challenge in comparative research (see e.g., Hopmann, Esser, & de 
Vreese, 2017; Rössler, 2012). Therefore, we took several steps to ensure inter-coder reliability. 
First, proceeding from an initial five-day coder training of eight Swiss coders, we conducted 
several pre-tests, based on which some variable descriptions and definitions were revised and 
discussed. Second, we conducted a three-day international coder training with a core-team of 
three countries to ensure and improve the international applicability of the constructs to be 
measured. Third, we conducted an intensive three-day international coder training with coders 
from all countries. In a fourth and final step, we formally tested the inter-coder reliability based 
on English-language material (31 online news articles) before the start of the country-specific 
coding. 
As Table 5.3 clarifies, we report percentage agreement, Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa 
(Brennan & Prediger, 1981), as well as two versions of Fretwurst’s Lotus (Fretwurst, 2015a, 
2015b). The unstandardized Lotus can be directly interpreted and represents the percentage 
agreement of coders with the category most used by all coders. The standardized Lotus is a 
chance-corrected version that also takes into account, the number of categories used by coders. 
Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa is similar to S-Lotus but is based on standard percentage agree-
ment among all coders. Both measures are more robust in assessing the reliability of rare cate-
gories and multiple coders, than Krippendorff’s Alpha and Cohen’s Kappa (Hopmann et al., 
2017; Quarfoot & Levine, 2016)3. 
With regard to the unstandardized Lotus, all variable groups achieved satisfactory inter-
coder reliability scores. Only the scores for ‘secondary topic’ were somewhat lower. The 
chance-corrected S-Lotus scores and Brennan and Prediger’s k were generally slightly lower. 
The coding of formal variables still achieved good standardized inter-coder reliability scores. 
With regard to the topic variables, the reliability of the ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ topic was 
somewhat lower. With regard to the substantive variables to measure populism, the results were 
still acceptable. However, the results for variables such as ‘discrediting the elite’, ‘blaming the 
elite’, and ‘detaching the elite from the people’, were slightly lower. This may be partly due to 
the substantial closeness of these categories, since the reliability improved when the variables 
were combined into a dummy variable for anti-elitism (S-Lotus for anti-elitism = .75). The style 
variables (except for ‘privatization’) also achieved lower standardized reliability scores. This 
was somewhat to be expected due to their evaluative character (see e.g.,Hopmann et al., 2017). 
As these scores show, the reliability of our codebook could be further improved. How-
ever, we wish to emphasize that the material used for the reliability testing was in English, 
which was not the native language for most of the coders, while the actual coding of the mate-
rial was completed in the coders’ native language. The choice of English-language material 
was necessary to compare reliability across all countries. However, reliability tests in a project 
language typically result in lower reliability scores and thus, may underestimate the quality of 
the actual coding (Hopmann et al., 2017; Rössler, 2012). 
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Outlet 97 .97 .98 .98 
Author 83 .80 .89 .89 
Political author 97 .96 .97 .97 
Length of article 84 .79 .89 .85 





 Primary topic 72 .70 .82 .81 
Secondary topic 34 .30 .49 .48 








Approaching the people 70 .41 .78 .57 
Praising the people’s virtues 92 .83 .94 .89 
Praising the people’s achievements 97 .94 .98 .96 
Describing the people as homogenous 71 .41 .79 .58 
Discrediting the elite 61 .22 .71 .42 
Blaming the elite 67 .34 .76 .51 
Detaching the elite from the people 71 .42 .8 .6 
Demanding popular sovereignty 91 .82 .94 .89 
Denying elite sovereignty 99 .98 .99 .99 
Excluding ‘others’ from the people 79 .57 .85 .71 
Discrediting ‘others’ 89 .78 .93 .86 
Blaming ‘others’ 87 .74 .91 .83 
People-centrism (Dummy) 67 .35 .76 .53 
Anti-elitism (Dummy) 81 .61 .88 .75 
Sovereignty (Dummy) 90 .80 .94 .87 





Negativity 44 .33 .59 .49 
Negativity (dummy) 68 .52 .81 .62 
Emotional tone 44 .26 .6 .4 
Emotional tone (dummy) 71 .42 .82 .64 
Dramatization 47 .29 .62 .42 
Dramatization (dummy) 64 .27 .78 .57 
Privatization 84 .76 .9 .8 
Polarization 55 .33 .67 .35 
Colloquial language 64 .46 .74 .47 




In this chapter, we concentrate on descriptive results in response to the research ques-
tions. First, we provide an initial comparison of the levels of the four dimensions of populist 
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key messages – people-centrism, anti-elitism, sovereignty, and exclusion – across countries. 
Second, we investigate the relationship between the dimensions. Finally, we compare speak-
ers as well as targets of populist key messages across countries. To ensure comparability and 
functional equivalence across countries, we conducted most of the following data analyses for 
the two different samples, separately. However, we draw comparisons between the opinion 
piece and the immigration news sample where we believe that such comparisons are meaning-
ful. While the following chapter by Maurer et al. will focus solely on the second wave and the 
chapter by Esser et al. will compare the two waves, in this chapter the data from both waves 
was combined. 
Dimensions of Populism in News Coverage (RQ1) 
Let us first look at the overall distribution of populist key messages in the investigated 
articles. In the opinion piece sample (N = 1220), more than half of all articles (59%, n = 714) 
contained at least one populist key message. Most of these articles contained only one dimen-
sion of populist communication (47%, n = 568). Around a tenth of articles (11%, n = 131) had 
two dimensions and only around 1% (n = 15) included three or all four dimensions. By far the 
most commonly used dimension of populist communication was anti-elitism, which occurred 
in about half of all articles (51%, n = 617). People-centrism occurred in 14% (n = 169), exclu-
sion in 6% (n = 67), and sovereignty was almost absent (2%, n = 23). In the immigration sam-
ple (N = 1523), the distribution of populist key messages showed similarities but also notable 
differences. While the order of the four dimensions was the same, the proportion of articles 
that contained at least one populist key message was around 20% lower (40%, n = 604). 
Around a third of all articles contained one dimension of populism (32%, n = 491), 6% (n = 
96) included two dimensions, and 1% contained three or four dimensions (n = 17). Thereby, 
anti-elitist messages appeared in 30% of all articles (n = 459) and people-centrism in 9% (n = 
135). Remarkably, with 8% (n = 126), exclusion was the only dimension that occurred more 
often in the immigration sample than in the opinion piece sample. Finally, key messages re-
lated to the sovereignty dimension were, again, only very seldom used (1%, n = 16). 
In a second step, we compared the levels of populism descriptively across countries. 
Figure 5.2 compares the extent of the overall populism in the media index between the two 
samples, and shows that there is a strong correlation between them (b = 1.04, b = .83, p < 
.001, R2 = .65). This indicates a “synchronization” between news reports and commentary in 
the sense of Schoenbach (2008). However, the level of populism was lower in the immigra-
tion news sample than in the opinion piece sample for all countries, except for the Czech Re-
public which showed the same level of populism across both samples (39%). 
For both samples, the highest levels of populism were found in Israel and Poland, and 
the lowest levels in Norway. In relation to Poland, however, we have to bear in mind that with 
49 opinion pieces and only eleven articles on immigration, its results were based on the small-
est sample among the countries.4 When we compare the two samples relating to the country 
order, Germany, Bulgaria, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic were ranked higher in the im-
migration news sample compared to the opinion piece sample, whereas Greece, France, the 




Figure 5.2 Comparison between the two samples relating to the degree of populism expressed 
by the populism in the media index (values 0-4) 
Note. The grey line depicts a linear regression (b = 1.04, b = .83, p < .001, R2 = .65, N = 12). 
 
Figure 5.3 displays the distribution of the four dimensions of populist communication 
across countries for the two samples. In both samples and across all countries, anti-elitism 
was the most prominent dimension of populist communication, mostly followed by people-
centrism, although some differences, which will be discussed in more detail below, could be 
identified between countries. 
Populism in opinion pieces appeared to be mostly driven by anti-elitism. This applied 
especially to Poland and Greece, whereas in Bulgaria and Norway, commentaries were least 
anti-elitist. A more people-centrist populist rhetoric was found in commentaries in the United 
Kingdom, France, and Israel. In these three countries, between 20% and 40% of opinion 




Figure 5.3 The four dimensions of populist communication in opinion pieces and immigration 
news across countries 
Note. The Y-axis reports mean values of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles 
that contain the respective dimension. The four dimensions add up to the populism in the media index (0-4). 
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Bulgaria was the only country with a more exclusionist than people-centrist rhetoric in opinion-
oriented articles. In Germany and Israel, the levels of exclusion were also high at 10% and 15% 
respectively. In the remaining countries, less than 5% of opinion pieces contained exclusionist 
key messages. Sovereignty was below 5% across all countries except for the United Kingdom 
where, at 8%, it surpassed exclusion. Israel exhibited the most complete populist communica-
tion with relatively high levels in all dimensions. 
Similar to opinion pieces, populist communication in immigration news was largely 
dominated by anti-elitism. Again, the media conveyed most anti-elitist messages in Poland and 
Greece, followed by Israel and Germany. Immigration news was least anti-elitist in Norway, 
followed by Serbia, where anti-elitism was distinctly lower in comparison to opinion pieces. 
People-centrism in immigration news was highest in Israel, trailed by Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Switzerland. The levels of people-centrism in the United Kingdom, which were the highest in 
the opinion piece sample, were notably lower in the immigration sample. A similar tendency 
was found for France. Although articles on immigration seemed to be overall less populist than 
opinion pieces, they contained more exclusionist key messages, especially in Israel, Germany, 
and Bulgaria. In the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Serbia, exclusionist key 
messages appeared more often than people-centrist key messages.  As in the opinion piece sam-
ple, Israel displayed the most complete populist communication, except for the absence of the 
sovereignty dimension. 
Relationship Between the Dimensions of Populist Communication (RQ2) 
As we elaborated in the theory and methods, we conceive of populist communication as 
a formative concept based on four dimensions which complement each other. However, the 
question remains about how these four dimensions relate to each other empirically. In response 
to the second research question, we investigated these relationships in our data. 
On the story level, almost all bivariate correlations between the four dimensions were 
significantly positive in both samples (see Table 5.4). However, what we are even more inter-
ested in is the correlation of these dimensions on an aggregated level. This allows us to compare 
the relationship between dimensions across countries. 
 
Table 5.4 Bivariate correlations between dimensions of populist communication on the story 
level 
 People-Centrism Anti-Elitism Sovereignty Exclusion 
 Opinion Immigr. Opinion Immigr. Opinion Immigr. Opinion Immigr. 
People-Centrism 1 1 .07* .12** .12** .06* .06* .12* 
Anti-Elitism .07* .12* 1 1 .08** .02 -.01 .06* 
Sovereignty .12** .06* .08** .02 1 1 .02 .06* 
Exclusion .06* .12* -.01 .06* .02 .06* 1 1 





Figure 5.4 illustrates the relationship between the first two dimensions, people-centrism 
and anti-elitism, across the twelve countries in the immigration news sample. As the figure 
shows, there was a curvilinear relationship between the two dimensions (R2 = .54, p < .05). 
Thus, higher levels of people-centrism in the media did not necessarily lead to higher levels of 
anti-elitism, and vice versa. There were some countries, for example Greece and Poland, with 
high levels of anti-elitism but comparatively low levels of people-centrism. Other countries, 
such as Norway, Italy, and the Czech Republic were low on both dimensions. Finally, some 
countries had moderate to high levels of both people-centrism and anti-elitism. Among those 
were, for example, Israel, Switzerland, and France. 
Figure 5.5 analogously depicts the relationship between people-centrism and exclusion 
in the immigration sample. Different to its relationship with anti-elitism, people-centrism rather 
had a linear relationship with exclusion (b = 0.88, p < .001, R2 = .45, p < .01). Hence, the more 




Figure 5.4 Immigration sample: Relation between people-centrism & anti-elitism 
Note. Values represent country means of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles 





Figure 5.5 Immigration sample: Relationship between people-centrism and exclusion 
Note. Values represent country means of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles 
that contain the respective dimension. 
 
Finally, Figure 5.6 compares the extent of anti-elitism and exclusion across countries in 
the immigration sample. Similar to people-centrism and anti-elitism, a curvilinear relation was 
found (R2 = .46, p < .05). This implies that more anti-elitism does not always lead to higher 
levels of exclusion. Rather, with regard to immigration coverage, there were some countries 
where the target of populist key messages was rather the elite (e.g. Poland and Greece), whereas 
in other countries ‘the others’ were more often the target (e.g. Israel, Germany, and Bulgaria). 
However, it must be kept in mind that in all countries the level of anti-elitism was much higher 
than the levels of exclusion and people-centrism. Thus, the scales in Figures 5.4 to 5.6 were 
adapted to the empirical maximum of the three dimensions to better illustrate the relationship 
between them.  
In summary, the relationships between the three dimensions, people-centrism, anti-elit-
ism, and exclusion in the immigration sample, indicate that only people-centrism and exclusion 
correlated linearly, while there was a curvilinear relationship between anti-elitism and the other 
two dimensions. The same tendencies could be identified for the opinion piece sample; how-
ever, there the relationships were not statistically significant. Thus, people-centrism, anti-elit-
ism, and exclusion were more clearly related in news on immigration than in opinion pieces. 
18 
 
Furthermore, relationships with the additional dimension of populist communication, sover-
eignty, were not included since, due to the low case numbers, no patterns of relationship could 
be identified. 
 
Figure 5.6 Immigration sample: Relationship between anti-elitism and exclusion 
Note. Values represent country means of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share 
of articles that contain the respective dim 
 
Comparison of Speakers (RQ3) 
As explained in the theoretical section, it is relevant to determine who the originators of 
populist key messages are. From a theoretical perspective, the most important distinction is 
whether the speakers of populist key messages are journalists themselves, or politicians who 
are quoted in the articles. Journalists (n = 856, 64.9% of articles with populist key messages) 
and politicians (n = 384, 29.1%) were also, empirically, the two most important speaker cate-
gories across all investigated countries and both samples. Figure 5.7 compares the average ex-
tent of populist communication by political speakers and media speakers per country between 
samples. In contrast to the earlier figures, the samples were distinguished into three groups: 
articles that only belong to the immigration sample (circle shape), articles that only belong to 
the opinion sample (square shape), and articles that are part of both samples (i.e. opinion pieces 
on the topic of immigration; triangle shape). We made this additional distinction here because 
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earlier research implies that those voicing populist messages may be different for opinion-ori-
ented and straight news (Blassnig, Ernst, Büchel, Engesser, & Esser, 2018; Hameleers et al., 
2017). Analogous to the overall populism in the media index, the two indices for political 
speaker and media speaker are sum indices of dummy variables for the four dimensions (0-4). 
Thus, the x-axis shows the extent of populist communication by media speakers, and the y-axis 
the extent of populist communication by political speakers, both aggregated on the country level 
per sub-sample. The solid line represents how the distribution would look if there were a perfect 
linear relationship between the speaker types and, thus, a one to one ratio. Data points that are 
plotted below the solid line, have more populist key messages by media speakers than by polit-
ical speakers, and for data points above the solid line, the opposite is true.  
 
 
Figure 5.7. Comparison of political and media speakers expressed by the populism in the me-
dia index 
Note. Values represent country means of the populism in the media index (0-4) per speaker type. 
 
As figure 5.7 reveals, across all countries, news articles on immigration exhibited higher 
levels of populism by political speakers, whereas opinion pieces (regardless of the topic) dis-
played higher levels of populism by media speakers. There were two exceptions: In Bulgaria, 
opinion pieces had higher levels of populism by political speakers, and in Switzerland, news 
articles on immigration had higher levels of populism by media speakers. In Polish immigration 
news and French opinion pieces, the ratio between political and media speakers was one to one. 
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Thus, populism by journalists was higher in opinion-oriented pieces (M = 0.56, SD = 0.67) than 
in immigration news (M = 0.13, SD = 0.37, F = 410.64, p < .001, ƞ2 = .13), while news articles 
on immigration were more dominated by populism by political speakers (M = 0.21, SD = 0.47) 
than opinion pieces (M = 0.12, SD = 0.35, F = 33.77, p < .001, ƞ2 = .012). This seems reasonable 
and in line with theoretical expectations as well as with other recent studies (Blassnig et al., 
2018; Hameleers et al., 2017). 
Comparison of Targets (RQ4) 
Finally, to answer RQ4, we compared the three target groups of populist communication 
across the analyzed countries: ‘the elite’, ‘the people’, and ‘the others’. For each populist key 
message, which had to be aimed at one or two of these target groups, we coded how these 
groups were defined. Hereafter, we discuss how the elite, the people, and the others were con-
ceptualized in the analyzed articles across countries. In contrast to the previous analyses, we 
did not differentiate between the two samples. On one hand, this was due to low case numbers 
for the individual target groups. On the other hand, similar patterns could be identified for both 
samples. 
Firstly, across all countries, the most prominently targeted elite of populist key messages 
was the political elite (on average in 78%, n = 840, of all articles containing ‘the elite’ as target 
of populist key messages, n = 1079). This was followed by the supranational elite (11%, n = 
121), which in most cases will be the European Union. All other elites were attacked consider-
ably less often (in less than 10%). 
Secondly, ‘the people’, who is typically the target of positive and advocative populist 
key messages, were mostly addressed in a generalized or unspecific manner (on average in 
49%, n = 237, of all articles containing key messages targeting the people, n = 484). This was 
followed by a political notion of the people (27%, n = 129) which describes the people in their 
political function within society, e.g. as voters, electorate, taxpayers, or citizens. However, a 
geographical conception of the people was more common in Norway, Switzerland, the Czech 
Republic, and France. This implies an emphasis on national borders and foreigners. Legal (e.g. 
‘law-abiding), economic (e.g. ‘hardworking), religious (e.g., ‘Christians’), or cultural (e.g. ‘oc-
cidental’) definitions of the people were found in less than 10% of all articles that contained 
“the people” as a target for populist key messages. 
Conceptualizations of ‘the others’ are, in theory, closely related to conceptions of ‘the 
people’. Therefore, ‘the others’ can be differentiated into the same subgroups. However, as the 
others are, by definition, a specific social group, they cannot be ‘general or unspecified’. While 
exclusion of others is generally low across all countries, there were differences in how ‘the 
others’ were defined. Similar to ‘the people’, ‘the others’ were most often defined in a political 
manner (on average in 40%, n = 77, of all articles containing key messages targeting ‘the oth-
ers’, n = 139) which refers to persons within their own country who are not legal citizens or 
who are excluded from the political function of the people (e.g. non-citizens). Exceptions were 
Israel and Bulgaria, where cultural (e.g. ‘oriental’) or religious (e.g. ‘Muslims’) conceptualiza-
tions of ‘the others’ were more important, as well as France, where ‘the others’ were mostly 
defined in geographical terms (e.g. ‘foreigners’). Economic (e.g. ‘the poor’) or legal (e.g. ‘crim-
inals’) reasons for the exclusion of ‘others’ were very seldom found.  
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Some connections between the conceptualization of ‘the people’ and the ‘others’ could 
be identified. This was most noticeable in relation to the importance of religious aspects in 
Israel and Poland, as well as cultural aspects in Israel and Bulgaria. However, there were also 
notable differences. For example, religion played a more important role in the definition of 
‘others’ than of ‘the people’ in most countries, whereas economic differentiations were more 
relevant for ‘the people’ than ‘the others’. Finally, which elite was targeted did not seem to be 
directly related to how ‘the people’ or ‘the others’ were defined. Rather, the political elite was 
the main focus of anti-elitism in all countries. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the theoretical background for the analysis of 
populism in the media, as well as to provide a detailed description of the method of the inter-
national content analysis of immigration news and opinion pieces in print media across twelve 
countries and two waves. Furthermore, this chapter presented first descriptive results regarding 
the four dimensions of populist communication (RQ1), their relationship (RQ2), speakers 
(RQ3), and targets (RQ4) across countries as well as across both samples. 
Overall, the news media included populist key messages to the highest extent in Israel 
and Poland, and lowest in Norway. While in some countries populist communication seemed 
to be more common in opinion pieces (United Kingdom, France, Serbia), in other countries 
populism seemed to be more specific to immigration news coverage (Germany, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic). However, opinion pieces had a higher tendency to be populist than immigration 
news across all countries. This may be explained by the fact that in straight news articles, jour-
nalists follow professional norms, such as objectivity, more strictly than in opinion pieces which 
may have a generally more polemic nature and where the media may be more critical towards 
the establishment and more advocative on behalf of the people (Blassnig et al., 2018; Esser et 
al., 2017; Hameleers et al., 2017). Moreover, news on immigration contained more exclusionist 
key messages. This confirms the theoretical expectations that the topic of immigration is par-
ticularly vulnerable to exclusionist populist rhetoric. 
With regard to the first research question, the descriptive results showed similarities as 
well as notable differences across countries. In all countries, of the four dimensions of popu-
lism, news media mostly conveyed anti-elitism in their articles and commentaries. However, 
since it is very difficult to draw a clear distinction between populist and “normal” elite criticism, 
these high levels of anti-elitism need to be interpreted with some caution. Although we would 
argue that blaming, discrediting, or detaching the elite from the people as defined in our oper-
ationalization, provides a fertile ground for populism by itself, only in combination with the 
other dimensions does it represent complete populism.  
In Greek, Polish, and German media especially, an anti-elitist populism prevailed. In 
Greece and Poland, besides the generalized ‘government’, this anti-elitism was also often ad-
dressed towards the supranational or media elite respectively. This may be attributable to the 
strong populist parties in these countries. However, since in both countries populist actors were 
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in government at the time, some anti-elitist critique may have also been directed at them. Ger-
many was also among the countries with the highest levels of excluding key messages in the 
media (together with Israel and Bulgaria). While this may partly be explained by the recent rise 
of the populist right-wing party AfD, it was mostly due to the frequent, and to some extent, 
innocuous juxtaposition of refugees and the populace in the press, given that Germany was the 
main host country for Syrian refugees. In Bulgaria, this can be related to the nationalist parties 
whose populist rhetoric has intensified specifically with regard to the topic of immigration, 
expressing discontent both with European immigration policies as well as with Bulgarian au-
thorities (Raycheva, 2017). Israeli news media exhibited the most complete form of populism, 
with relatively high levels of all four dimensions. On one hand, this was surprising since, unlike 
most countries in the sample, Israel does not have political parties commonly known to be pop-
ulist. On the other hand, this can be explained by the deep social cleavages in Israeli society 
and the ongoing struggles over the very definition of ‘the people’, which make populist rhetoric 
ubiquitous across the political spectrum (Weiss Yaniv & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2017).  
However, in other countries such as Switzerland, Bulgaria, and France, the media in-
cluded moderate to high levels of populist communication on all four dimensions. Journalists 
were the least likely to incorporate populism into articles or commentaries in Norway, Serbia, 
and Italy. Mostly with regard to the latter, this was rather surprising given that in Italy, populist 
parties have been on the rise for some time (Bobba & Legnante, 2017). However, this may be 
due to several high-level political events (constitutional reform, resignation of prime minister, 
appointment of new government) that may have shifted the media’s attention (see also the chap-
ter by Esser et al. in this volume). 
In response to the second research question, we found significant correlations among 
the four dimensions on the story level. On an aggregated level, related to the findings already 
summarized, we identified a curvilinear relationship between people-centrism and anti-elitism 
as well as between anti-elitism and exclusion. Thus, in some countries the media seemed to 
display a more people-centrist populism, while in other countries populism in the media was 
more anti-elitist or exclusionist. People-centrism and exclusion, in contrast, had a linear rela-
tion, indicating that higher levels of people-centrism were associated with higher levels of ex-
clusion in the media. This implies that the media may contribute to the construction of an an-
tagonism between in and out-groups. 
With regard to the speakers, the descriptive analysis showed that in opinion pieces, jour-
nalists mostly communicated populist key messages themselves, while they predominantly 
cited populist key messages by political speakers in straight news on immigration. Thus, popu-
lism by the media may most likely be identified in opinion-oriented media formats, while pop-
ulism through the media is more common in straight news. However, one must keep in mind 
that also, populist statements by political actors must pass the editorial gates and are thus subject 
to journalistic selection. 
Finally, with regard to the target groups of populist communication, a first descriptive 
glance showed that while journalists or politicians conceptualized ‘the people’ mostly in a gen-
eralized or unspecific manner, they defined ‘the elite’ and ‘the others’ most often in political 
terms. This indicates a more general form of populism, defining the people as ‘sovereign’, that 
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can be applied across the whole political spectrum (Kriesi, 2014). Moreover, we could not con-
firm that the conceptualizations of the three target groups were as closely connected empirically 
as was theoretically implied. We also identified certain differences that may be explained by 
the country-specific context. This applied, for example, to Israel, Poland, and Bulgaria where 
cultural and religious notions of ‘the people’ and ‘the others’ seemed to be more important. 
This can be attributed to the strong position of the Catholic Church in Poland, of the Eastern 
Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, as well as with the specific role of the Roma as minority. In 
Israel, this can be related to the conflict between different religious and ethnic groups, most 
notably between the Jewish and Arab population, but also within Jewish society (e.g., ultra-
orthodox Jews are often cast as “the others”). 
As with any investigation, this study has certain limitations. First, while we conducted 
a comparative analysis in twelve countries across four different European regions, our country 
selection and thus, our scope, is limited. Second, within these countries we only analyzed a 
limited sample of print news outlets. Thus, our findings cannot be generalized to other mass 
media channels, online, or social media platforms. Third, while we believe that our two sam-
pling strategies complement each other, we only looked at certain story types’ respective issues. 
Thus, our findings may be specific to the respective news culture in relation to opinion-oriented 
journalism as well as the specific issue culture with regard to the topic of immigration. How-
ever, this can also be used as a strength in terms of the analysis, as the following chapters by 
Maurer et al. and Esser et al. will demonstrate. Nevertheless, our sampling strategies may have 
led to some bias as the large differences in sample sizes between countries indicates. For in-
stance, in countries where immigration is not a continuously heated issue on the political and 
media agenda (e.g., Israel, Poland), the sample of two constructed weeks of immigration news 
may not be representative of populist communication in these countries. However, the opinion 
piece sample, which often corroborated the patterns found in the immigration sample, helped 
to offset this limitation. Finally, so far we have not analyzed how the populist key messages 
were presented in the media. While news media may neutrally disseminate such messages based 
on criteria such as newsworthiness or objectivity, they may also challenge populist messages, 
for example, responding to anti-elitism directed at the media or to expose populism as a threat 
to democracy (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018). In contrast, journalists could 
also provide a favorable setting for populist messages by reinforcing or legitimizing them. This 
important aspect for the interpretation of the extent of populism in the media across countries, 
was not addressed in this first descriptive analysis. 
This chapter provides the basis for the next two chapters. Thus, the following chapters 
build on the definition of populist communication, the conceptual framework, and the described 
methodological approach. While the data analysis in this chapter has remained descriptive, the 
chapter by Maurer et al. takes a more explanatory approach and tries to identify specific factors 
that explain differences in the levels of populist communication and its dimensions across coun-
tries and media outlets. The chapter by Esser et al. will then focus on a temporal perspective 
and try to understand the influence of situational factors by comparing differences in populism 
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Notes
1 Exceptions were France (where national presidential elections took place on April 23 and May 7, 2017) and 
Bulgaria (where national parliamentary elections took place on March 26, 2017). 
2 In Greece, Israel, and Bulgaria, where the digital versions were not obtainable, the newspapers were gathered in 
print. 
3 For a good summary of Lotus’s advantages and an example of its application for international comparative con-
tent analysis, see also Hopmann et al (2017). 
4 There are two reasons for this: First, national policy issues were of higher relevance in Poland than the interna-
tional immigration crisis. Second, the distinction between opinion-oriented and straight news format is not as 
straightforward in Poland as it is in other countries. 
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